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In 2008/ 2009, a severe economic crisis struck the world economy. Many macro-economists 
assumed that the global financial crisis would change the prevalent way of economic thinking. This 
paper considers this idea and raises the question if a paradigm change in the German debate on 
macroeconomic policy has occurred. To this end, the paper analyzes and compares the 
macroeconomic policy recommendations of the most important German macroeconomic reports – 
Sachverständigenratsgutachten and Gemeinschaftsdiagnose – during the course of three economic 
slumps, including the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. The comparison shows that – 
notwithstanding that some minor changes in economic policy took place – there has been no 
paradigm change in the economic policy debates since the 2008/2009 world crisis. The absence of a 
significant change in the policy concepts raises the question of why there is such a high stability of 
the approaches of the two reports. It is suggested that the institutional context in which the expert 
discourse is embedded contributes to this stability.  
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The 2008/2009 global economic crisis constituted a severe event in the mindset of economists. In 
the face of the crisis, many economists supposed that the time had come for a fundamental change 
in our way of handling and analysing the economy, and some of them already believed to have 
witnessed a paradigm change in economic policy.1 Have we experienced a significant change in 
prevailing economic views? Has the economic crisis lead to a crisis of concepts? 
Crises, and particularly economic crises, are thought to be conducive for the rise of new 
ideas.2 Severe economic crises create a state of uncertainty which is believed to facilitate a change 
of ideas and policies: the struggle with uncertainty may result in new concepts gaining prevalence 
and finally substituting the preexisting ideas. Crises are, however, by no means a guaranty for 
change. They may even reinforce existing approaches and patterns of action.3  
In this article, I want to address the question of whether or not the global financial crisis has 
led to a significant change in the expert discourses on economic policy: has the global financial 
crisis stimulated a paradigm change in the ideas of economic experts or has the crisis so far 
produced no impact, or perhaps, has it reinforced the dominant concepts in the expert discourses 
about economic policy?  
                                                 
 
1 Gustav Horn, for instance, declared in the TV-broadcast, ‘Plus Minus’, of the public channel ‘Das Erste’ (14th of 
October 2008) that the year 2008 would be carved into the gravestone of neo-liberalism: ‘Auf dem Grabstein einer 
neoliberalen Strategie der Deregulierung wird das Jahr 2008 als Todesdatum stehen.’ (PlusMinus, 2008). A similar 
statement can be found in a policy brief published in 2008 by Eckhard Hein et al. (Hein, Horn, Joegbes, van Treeck and 
Zwiener, 2008). Another example is Martin Wolf’s comment published in the ‘Financial Times’ at the end of 2008: 
‘We are all Keynesians now. When Barack Obama takes office he will propose a gigantic fiscal stimulus package. Such 
packages are being offered by many other governments. Even Germans are being dragged, kicking and screaming, into 
this race.’ (Martin Wolf, Financial Times, end of 2008, as cited in Pugh and Garatt, 2009, p. 4) More prevalent were 
comments questioning the future of capitalism and suggesting an end of the capitalist era: for instance, the front page of 
the conservative German newspaper ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ from the 9th of October 2008 exhibited an image of Karl 
Marx and was titled ‘The Bankruptcy of Capitalism’ (‘Die Pleite des Kapitalismus’).  
2 Blyth, 2002; Boin and Hart, 2003; Chwieroth, 2010; Hall, 1993; Jessop, 2009; Keeler, 1993; Mandelkern and Shalev, 
2010. 
3 Boin and Hart, 2003; Boin et. Al, 2005. 
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I define expert discourse on economic policy as public communication that is emitted by 
economic experts and consists of comprehendible assessments of the economic situation combined 
with policy recommendations. These communications often assume the form of economic 
statements and reports which are released – among other bodies – by economic research institutes. 
A central function of the expert discourse on economic policy is to provide the public and political 
sphere with economic knowledge and to advise the decision making process of politicians. 
Economic experts act in this discourse as advisers translating economic expert knowledge into 
applicable policy recommendations.4 This being said, the expert discourse on economic policy 
could also be described as the discourse of economic policy advisers.  
For the German discourse on economic policy, two economic reports are particularly 
important: the ‘Jahresgutachten des Sachverständigenrates’ (Yearly Economic Survey of the Expert 
Advisory Board on Economics) and the ‘Gemeinschaftsdiagnose’ (a semi-annual report of a 
selected group of economic research institutes). Both reports include recommendations for the 
economic policy of the state and exert significant influence over economic policy debates in 
Germany’s public and political spheres. They reflect to a great extent the expert debates regarding 
economic policy in Germany. This paper will analyze and compare the policy recommendations of 
these two reports during three economic slumps between 1990 and 2010. The objective of this study 
is to describe the expert discourse on economic policy in these two reports and to determine 
whether a substantial change – or paradigm change – in their policy concepts has taken place. Since 
the majority of policy recommendations in the reports concern monetary, fiscal, labour market and 
wage policy, the focus of the analysis will be on these policy areas.   
The article is structured in the following way: it begins with a brief description of the two 
reports and the methods of the study. After this, I will summarize the policy recommendations of 
the two reports during each slump. The following section compares the policy recommendations 
                                                 
4 Frey and Kirchgässner, 2002, p. 467; Weingart, 2008, pp. 12. 
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during the three slumps and addresses the question if there has been, in fact, a significant change in 
the economic debates. The article ends with a discussion of the results and a potential explanation 
for the findings. This explanation suggests that the institutional setting in which the expert discourse 




This paper seeks to determine if a significant change in the expert discourse on economic policy 
took place between 1990 and 2010. I explore this question on the basis of the two most important 
economic reports in Germany’s expert discourse on economic policy: 
‘Sachverständigenratsgutachten’ and ‘Gemeinschaftsdiagnose’.5 It is particularly their remarkable 
impact which makes these two reports a convenient subject of study for exploring the German 
expert discourse on economic policy. Due to their enormous influence they can be regarded as 
representing, to a certain extent, the policy debates of economic experts in Germany. 
The ‘Sachverständigenratsgutachten’ (SVR) is a yearly economic report written by five 
specifically chosen economic experts who are also known as ‘the five economic sages’. For the 
selection process, the German government proposes potential members to the federal president, who 
makes the final decision on the composition of the SVR. Each ‘sage’ is assigned for a time period 
of five years. After finishing the term he can be reassigned. In the time span of this study (1990-
2010) most ‘sages’ stayed for at least two periods in the SVR. Thus, there is a high stability in the 
composition of the SVR. Many members formed part of the SVR during two of the three economic 
slumps.6  
                                                 
5 Subsequently, we will use the abbreviations ‘SVR’ for the ‘Sachverständigenrat’/ ‘Sachverständigenratsgutachten’ and 
‘GD’ for the ‘Gemeinschaftsdiagnose’. 
6 Horst Siebert, for example, was a member of the SVR during the first post-reunification slump in 1992/1993, the long 
economic stagnation from 2001 to 2005, while Wolfgang Wiegard and Wolfgang Franz were members during the long 
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The ‘Gemeinschaftdiagnose’ (GD) is released twice a year and is written by a compendium 
of at least five economic research institutes. The composition of the compendium changes over 
time. A compendium of research institutes works for at least three years together. After finishing its 
term, a new compendium will be formed. Economic research institutes can apply to form part of the 
new compendium. Their applications are evaluated in a multistage selection process by the German 
Ministry Of Economics which determines the final composition of the new compendium. Similarly 
to the SVR, there is a high stability in the composition of the institutes involved in the GD: 
notwithstanding some minor modifications, the general composition of the compendium did not 
change significantly over the time span of this study.7 
The economic reports written by the SVR and GD consist of different parts: they include an 
analysis of the current economic situation, an economic forecast and recommendations for 
economic policy which concern generally fiscal, monetary, labour market, and wage policy. 
Regarding its physical format the SVR represents a much more extensive report of around five 
hundred pages which includes often expertise about specific topics (e.g. the reform of the health 
insurance system in Germany), while GD reports range generally between forty and one hundred 
pages.  
This study focuses on the economic recommendations published in these reports. The 
economic recommendations of each of the reports are normally the product of a consensus of all – 
or at least a majority – of its participants. In the case of diverting opinions, the reports may include 
minority votes that are generally opinions from single actors (‘sage’ or research institutes) among 
the experts participating in the report. Being a minority vote, they do not reflect the general opinion 
                                                                                                                                                                  
economic stagnation and the 2008/2009 world financial crisis. While many members formed part of the SVR during 
two economic slumps, no members remained during the whole period of the three slumps in the SVR. 
7 Among those economic research institutes that remained in the compendium are the IFO in Munich (Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München), the Institute for World Economy at the University of Kiel (Institut 
für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel), the Institute for Economic Research in Halle (Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle) and the RWI in Essen (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung). 
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of the economic experts writing the report. Therefore, the study focuses instead on the general 
position taken by the experts and will abstain from portraying the minority positions. 
The exploration of the policy recommendations in these reports particularly stresses 
monetary, fiscal, labour-market and wage policy. The recommendations will be categorized in short 
and long term policy recommendations.8 This categorization facilitates the classification of the 
recommendations and their chronological comparison.  
The study explores SVR and GD reports that were published during economic slumps 
between 1990 and 2010. The analysis of the policy recommendations during the slumps turns out to 
be opportune since a slump opens the possibility for short term policy reactions. This allows for the 
analysis of – in addition to long term measures – the kind of short term reactions proposed by the 
reports in order to deal with the slump. Moreover, since economic crises are presumed to facilitate 
changes in the economic thinking of economic experts, we can examine if experts do indeed modify 
or reconsider their economic concepts in the context of crises by studying policy approaches of 
economic experts during economic slumps.  
The real GDP growth rates in Germany, exhibited in Table 2, indicate the relevant economic 
slumps: the relevant economic slumps after the German reunification are the first post-reunification 
slump in 1992/1993, the long economic stagnation from 2001 to 2005, and the 2008/2009 global 
financial crisis.9  
 
                                                 
8 Short run policy seeks to absorb economic fluctuations and stabilize the economy at its equilibrium state. Thus, in case 
of slumps, specific fiscal or monetary policy measures may be implemented in order to stimulate the economy and to 
absorb the slump. Long run policy, instead, is concerned with the long run level of economic growth and is believed to 
influence the growth path of an economy. Usually, measures of long run policy address the institutional framework of 
an economy (e.g. regulations, tax system) as well as the level of long term investment. 
9 Another variable which was applied to identify the relevant slumps was the ‘real output gap’ which is not exhibited 




Table 1: Real GDP Growth Rates of Germany 1990-2010, Source: Eurostat (2011), 1990 and 1991 are estimated 
values taken from OECD (2011). 
 
As we can see in table 1, the 2008/2009 global financial crisis had a significantly higher 
impact on the German economy than the two former slumps. The massive downturn of the German 
economy was experienced as a potential threat to its foundations and spurred speculations about a 
general change in the economic discourse and policy. Therefore, particularly this last slump can be 
regarded as a potential stimulus for an immediate change in the economic thinking. I will examine 
whether or not such a change took place by comparing the policy recommendations during the 
global financial crisis and the two previous economic slumps.  
 
Comparing policy recommendations during the three post-reunification slumps 
In this section of the paper I explore the policy approaches of the SVR and GD report during 
different economic slumps after the German reunification. The following paragraphs briefly 




The first post-reunification slump (1992/ 1993)   
In 1992/ 1993 Germany experiences the first economic crisis after its reunification. The crisis 
begins with a harsh decrease of the economic growth in 1992 and turns in 1993 into an economic 
recession. The two reports comment on the economic slump and recommend different policy 
measures.  
The ‘Sachverständigenratsgutachten’ (SVR) of 1992 advises against any kind of short term 
measure to stabilize the economic cycle. Neither fiscal policy nor monetary policy should be 
applied to fight the slump.10 However, in 1993 the SVR changes its position slightly and approves 
the easing of the Bundesbanks’ monetary policy.11 Nevertheless, price stability should remain at the 
heart of monetary policy.12  
The slump is described as being mainly a product of structural problems. According to the 
SVR, these problems can only be addressed by a long term policy (‘Ordnungspolitik’) which would 
improve the conditions for economic supply. Thus, the SVR favours a supply side approach. This 
approach focuses on the competiveness of the German economy and seeks to increase its appeal for 
investments in order attract more investments and create more employment13. Particularly labour 
market and wage policy are important domains for the SVR’s supply side approach. Here, the SVR 
recommends increasing the flexibility of the labour market by easing job protection, cutting 
regulations on the job market and allowing more flexibility in the assignment of wages.14 Regarding 
wage growth, SVR recommends moderate growth of labour wages: the growth rate of wages should 
lie below the general growth of productivity (plus inflation).15 Other recommended long term policy 
measures focus on governmental spending and the state sector. The SVR asks for austerity 
measures in fiscal policy including a vigorous cutback of subsidies, the reduction of the public 
                                                 
10 SVR, 1992, p. 182. 
11 SVR, 1993, pp. 224. 
12 SVR, 1993, p. 226, p. 229. 
13 SVR 1992, p. 185, 1993, p. 195. 
14 SVR, 1992, p. 182, pp. 185. 
15 SVR, 1992, p. 23, p. 182, p. 227, p. 231, 1993, pp. 236. 
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sector, and the privatization of state-owned companies.16 Altogether, short term policy 
recommendations cover only a very sparse space in the reports of the SVR, while long term policy 
recommendations prevail and consist basically of the supply-side approach. 
The ‘Gemeinschaftsdiagnose’ (GD) favours a slightly more active approach in the short run. 
It suggests an active monetary policy to counteract the economic crisis and criticizes the German 
central bank for its hesitations in cutting the interest rates. The Bundesbank should decrease interest 
rates without compromising the price stability.17 In contrast to its active approach in monetary 
policy, the GD argues against any type of active fiscal reaction to the crisis: only the automatic 
stabilisers should take effect, while an active increase of governmental spending is refused.18 
Instead, the German government should implement a credible strategy for budget consolidation.19 
Concerning long run policy, GD also advocates a supply side approach and favours similar 
measures to those of the SVR.20 Economic policy should create an attractive framework for 
investments: 
 
In the current, unstable economic situation the economic policy has to be conducted in a way which 
increases lastingly (permanently) the willingness to invest. (GD, 1992,p. 23)21 
 
Only if the economic policy of the German government improves profit outlooks for private 
businesses, will it succeed in attracting more investments. The key for improving profit outlooks 
and attracting investments is modest growth rates of labour wages.22 Besides wage policy, fiscal 
policy is regarded as a central instrument for increasing the appeal of Germany’s economy. 
                                                 
16 SVR, 1992, p. 20, pp. 183, 1993, pp. 199, p. 208, p. 212. 
17 GD, 1992b, p. 31, p. 33. 
18 GD, 1993a, p. 23. 
19 GD, 1992a, p. 26, 1992b, p. 26. 
20 GD, 1992a, pp. 23. 
21 The quote was translated from the German original: ‘In der gegenwärtig labilen gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage müssen 
die wirtschaftspolitischen Akzente so gesetzt werden, daß die Investitionsbereitschaft nachhaltig gestärkt wird.’ (GD 
1992a: 23) 
22 GD 1992a, p. 24, 1992b, p. 27, 1993b, p. 10, p.22, p. 24. 
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Therefore, GD requests austerity measures and cutbacks in state expenditure.23 Despite strongly 
supporting the supply side approach, supply side recommendations are still less prevalent than in 
SVR reports during this slump.  
Notwithstanding some minor differences between the policy recommendations of the two 
reports, both reports hold similar policy approaches: active monetary policy in the short run, and 
supply side orientated policy in the long run.  
 
The long stagnation after the ‘New-Economy-Boom’ (2001-2005)   
At the end of 2001 begins a long stagnation phase for the German economy which persists until 
2005.24 The stagnation, which is characterized by very low output growth rates and high 
unemployment, is described by the two reports as a product of structural problems in Germany’s 
economy.25 
The policy recommendations of both reports – SVR and GD – highly resemble each other 
during this slump. Regarding short term policy both reports support – besides the employment of 
automatic stabilizers – an active monetary policy by the ECB.26,27 The task of short run stabilization 
is basically assigned to monetary policy, while countercyclical fiscal policy is rejected as a short run 
policy option.28 Yet, stabilizing the price-level should remain the principle objective of the ECB.29  
                                                 
23 GD 1992b, pp. 25, 1993b, pp. 23. 
24 Since the Germany economy still exhibited a negative output gap in 2005, the duration of the slump was defined as 
lasting until 2005.  
25 GD, 2001a, p. 43, 2003a, p. 32, 2005a, p. 28, p. 70, p. 73; SVR, 2001, p. 2, 2004, p. 2.  
26 Concerning monetary policy we have to take into account that the responsibility for monetary policy changed from 
the German Bundesbank to the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999. While German Bundesbank’s policy could 
address the specific situation of the German economy, ECB’s monetary policy responds to the economic situation of the 
Euro-zone and addresses all participating states.  
27 In 2001 the SVR is still reluctant with regard to a countercyclical approach in monetary policy (SVR, 2001, p. 10). In 
the following reports the SVR changes this position and appears to apply a New Consensus approach by referring to the 
Taylor-Rule. See SVR, 2002, pp. 310, 2003, p. 6, pp. 405, 2004, p. 68, p. 77, pp. 90. SVR and GD exhibit conformance 
with the policy of the ECB which is described as expansive. See SVR, 2002, p. 7,  p. 311; 2003,  pp. 25, 2005, p. 12; 
GD 2001b, p. 72, 2002a, p. 29, 2002b, p. 35, p.77´, 2003a, p. 73, 2003b, p. 64, p. 66, 2004a,  p. 74, p. 86, 2004b, p. 71.  
28 SVR, 2001, p. 2, p. 11, 2003, pp. 13; GD, 2001a, p. 75, 2001b, p. 67., 2004b, p. 69. 
29 SVR, 2001, p. 7, 2002, p. 7, p. 19, p. 311, 2003, p. 25, 2005, p. 411; GD, 2002a, p. 61. 
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In the long run, both reports favour supply side oriented policies. They recommend labour 
market reforms which increase flexibility and reduce job protection.30 Moreover, they strongly 
request moderate wage growth rates in order to improve the competitiveness of the German 
economy. The rate of wage growth should stay permanently below the growth rate of labour 
productivity.31 With regard to fiscal policy, the reports demand budget consolidation and the 
reduction of the public spending ratio by reducing subsidies and tax cuts. The government spending 
ratio should diminish.32  
Additionally, the reports promote long term state investments in infrastructure and the 
education system. This type of long term investments is believed to increase the capital stock of the 
German economy and to facilitate lasting economic growth.33 
Comparing the policy recommendations of both reports, they exhibit only minor differences. 
The most obvious of these differences is perhaps the emphasis which they place on long and short 
term policy: the SVR reports are more supply side oriented and stress less the area of short term 
policy. The GD reports, instead, support the idea of a short run expansion of monetary policy more 
openly and address the long run supply side measures less emphatically than the SVR.  
 
The global financial and economic crisis (2008/2009)  
In the second half of 2008 the global financial crisis strikes the German economy and produces a 
harsh recession in 2009. The reports perceive the crisis as simultaneously a product of structural 
problems in the German economy as well as a result of the global financial crisis which affects 
                                                 
30 SVR, 2001, p. 13, 2002, p. 12, pp. 216, 2003, pp. 24, 2004, pp. 506, 2005, p. 23, pp. 204, pp. 193; GD, 2002b, pp. 91, 
2002b, p. 79, 2004b, p. 81, pp. 88; 2005a, p. 96. 
31 SVR, 2001, p. 7, 2002, p. 7, p.11, 2003, pp. 24, 2004, pp. 28, pp. 501, 2005, pp. 193.; GD, 2001a, p. 74, pp. 87, 
2002a, p. 30, p. 64, 2002b, p. 79, pp. 91, 2003a, pp. 70, p. 78, 2003b, p. 70, 2004b, pp. 87, 2005a, p. 70, p. 96. 
32 SVR, 2002, pp. 16, 2003, pp. 18, 2004, pp. 26, 2005, p. 6, p. 37, pp. 324; GD, 2001a, pp. 75, 2002a, pp. 61, p. 71, 
2002b, p. 75, 2003a, pp. 71, p. 82, 2003b, pp. 71, 2004a, p. 74, p. 91, 2004b, pp. 90, 2005a, p. 87. 
33 SVR, 2002, pp. 226; GD, 2001a, p. 80; 2002a, pp. 71, 2003a, p. 72, pp. 80, 2003b, pp. 71, 2004a, p. 74, 2004b, p. 91, 
2005a, pp. 83. 
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Germany particularly through a downturn in exports and a destabilization of its finance sector.34 
Both reports describe the crisis as exceptional, and agree that such an exceptional crisis requires 
exceptional policy reactions. Therefore, both reports recommend countercyclical monetary and 
fiscal policy measures and support the unconventional short term policy measures undertaken by 
the ECB and the German government.35 Whereas during former slumps both reports stipulated only 
countercyclical monetary policy and advised against any type of active fiscal response, the task of 
stabilization is now extended to fiscal policy.36  
Yet, the implementation of active fiscal policy measures is regarded as an extraordinary 
measure which should only be applied in exceptional situations. Thus, the SVR states that its 
recommendations should not be qualified as a general plea for an active stabilization policy. 
Instead, the SVR argues against a general application of fiscal expansions during slumps:  
 
Discretionary fiscal policy is not justified in the case of a “normal” business cycle and smaller 
shocks. Besides the employment of convenient monetary policy measures it is sufficient to let the 
automatic stabilizers take effect in these situations. But the severe economic crisis of 2009 had 
nothing “normal”. Therefore, it would have been wrong to abstain from a discretionary fiscal policy. 
(SVR, 2009, p. 166)37 
  
                                                 
34 GD, 2009, p. 37, p. 42, p. 44; SVR, 2008, p- 7, p. 249, 2009, p. 22, p. 257, p. 272, p. 280-281.  
35 Both reports still appear to hesitate in 2008 with regard to the fiscal expansion. See for instance SVR, 2008, pp. 247, 
260, 2008b, pp. 79. But after the decision of the German government to implement the rescue packages, both reports 
express their support in 2009. See for countercyclical monetary policy SVR, 2008, p. 9, 24, 195; GD 2008b, pp. 80; 
2009a, p. 77, pp. 88, 2009b, p. 66. 
36 SVR, 2008, pp. 243, 2009, pp. 166, p. 174; GD, 2009a, p. 89, 2009b,  p. 61, p. 67. 
37 The quote was translated from the German original: ‘(…) dass bei „normalen“ Konjunkturverlauf und „kleineren“ 
Schocks eine diskretionäre Finanzpolitik nicht begründet werden kann. In solchen Situationen reicht es neben 
geeigneten geldpolitischen Maßnahmen aus, die automatischen Stabilisatoren wirken zu lassen. An der schweren 
Wirtschaftskrise 2009 war aber nichts „normal“. Deshalb wäre es falsch gewesen, wenn auf eine diskretionäre 
Finanzpolitik verzichtet worden wäre.’ (SVR, 2009, p. 166) 
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For the case of ‘normal’ economic downturns, an active countercyclical fiscal policy is not 
considered to be an appropriate policy option. The GD arguments in a similar way: the severity of 
the crisis is described as the reason for an active short run approach in fiscal policy.  
 
Due to the severity of the disruptions on the financial markets and the depth of the recession there 
was no alternative to the described strategy in fiscal policy. (GD, 2009b, p. 67)38  
 
Both reports justify their policy approach by the exceptionality and severity of the economic 
situation. Their argumentation underlines that active fiscal responses are an exceptional policy 
measures which should be limited to exceptional economic crises. Hence, stabilization policy 
remains a monetary policy task while fiscal policy is not considered to be a convenient method for 
stabilization policy in the case of ‘normal’ business cycles.  
Due to the strength of the economic downturn, short term policy receives higher attention 
than in former reports. Nevertheless, policy recommendations for the long run are not absent. The 
reports recommend combining short and long run measures: the short run fiscal stimulation 
packages should include mainly long term investments to increase the capital stock of the German 
economy. Such long term investments are particularly investments in the educational system and 
the public infrastructure.39 
Since active fiscal policy would increase the budget deficit, the two reports argue that the 
fiscal expansion should also involve a credible strategy for budget consolidation and its rigid 
implementation after the crisis.40 Other recommendations concerning the long term policy are 
supply side orientated claims to increase the labour market flexibility and to moderate wage growth. 
                                                 
38 The quote was translated from the German original ‘Aufgrund der Schwere der Verwerfungen an den Finanzmärkten 
und der Tiefe der Rezession gab es zur beschriebenen Grundausrichtung der Finanzpolitik keine Alternative.’ (GD, 
2009b,p. 67) 
39 SVR, 2008, p. 10, pp. 249, 2009, pp. 1, p. 16, p. 257, pp. 282; GD, 2008b, pp. 79. 
40 SVR, 2008, p. 10, pp. 254, 2009, pp. 9, p. 174, p. 179; GD, 2009a, p. 91, 2009b, p. 62. 
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These measures would improve the appeal for investments of the Germany economy. Moreover, 
with regard to the general tendency of a decreasing unemployment rate, the previously 
recommended measures concerning labour market flexibility –partly legislated by the German 
government – are evaluated positively. Despite this success, however, further steps to increase 
labour market flexibility are portrayed as necessary.41 
Again, the supply side approach shapes the long run recommendations of both reports. 
Supply side recommendations are, however, more pronounced in the SVR reports, whereas they are 
less present in GD reports. The GD reports, instead, focus more on short term policy.  
Besides the typical supply-side recommendations, the SVR reports address the financial 
crisis and discuss potential measures to stabilize the financial sector in the long run. The SVR 
recommends improving regulation of the finance sector by strengthening national and European 
control mechanisms, and establishing a European financial stability fund to which European finance 
institutions should contribute in order to privatize – at least partly – the risks of future financial 
failure.42 At the same time, however, the SVR warns against the danger of overregulation and 
putting the existing system into question.43 Another point which illustrates the reluctance of the 
reports to question the existing economic framework concerns Germany’s focus on exports. 
Although the crisis strongly affects the German economy by a severe downturn of exports, the 
problems and risks of Germany’s export orientation are not tackled in the reports.   
 
 
Has there been a significant change in the policy recommendations?  
                                                 
41 SVR, 2008, p. 13, p. 265, pp. 312, 2009, p. 22, p. 257, p. 272, pp. 280; GD, 2008b, pp. 78.  
42 SVR, 2008, pp. 164-185, 2009, pp. 12-16, pp. 146-162. 
43 SVR, 2008, p. 4. Interestingly, this type of recommendations is absent in the GD reports. Topics such as the 
regulation of the finance sector remain untouched 
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Having analyzed the policy recommendations of the SVR and GD reports during the three 
economic slumps, we can now determine if their policy approaches underwent a significant change. 
We can make three observations: there is a) a high similarity of the policy recommendations of the 
SVR and GD, b) a high stability of the policy recommendations over time, and c) a slight variation 
in the interpretation of the crises.  
a) The analysis of the SVR and GD reports during the three crises shows that their policy 
recommendations differ only slightly from each other. Both reports share the same short and 
long run policy approaches. The main difference is perhaps that the GD tends to support 
more openly short run economic measures. Another difference is that the SVR exhibits a 
high emphasis on long run policy, while in GD reports the proportion of text dedicated to 
short and long run policy reports is more balanced. Despite these differences, there appears 
to be a general consensus about the appropriate economic policy during each slump. 
b) The policy recommendations of both reports exhibit a high stability over time. Only in the 
short run policy there has perhaps occurred a small shift which led to a more active approach 
in monetary policy. Monetary policy becomes the instrument assigned with the 
responsibility of stabilizing the economy in the case of shocks – and, of course, to stabilize 
monetary value. While we can observe a small shift in the short run approach, 
recommendations concerning long run policy remain stable during the three economic 
slumps. Both reports, during each of the studied time periods, call for supply side policy 
measures which are presumed to improve the competitiveness of the German economy and 
its appeal for investments. Typical supply side recommendations are the cutting of public 
spending, the reduction of the public debt as well as the claims for more labour market 
flexibility and moderate wage growth. 
c) There exists a small degree of variation in the interpretation of the crises’ origins. The first 
post-reunification slump and the long period of stagnation following the ‘new economic 
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boom’ are interpreted as the product of structural problems in the German economy. In the 
case of the financial crisis, the definition of the crisis is different: the crisis is treated as an 
exceptional economic event that originates not only from the typical structural problems but 
also from the global financial crises affecting Germany’s banking sector and exports. The 
exceptionality of the crisis enables the reports to deviate slightly from their typical policy 
framework. 
 
Was there a paradigm change in the policy approaches of SVR and GD? Considering the previous 
observations, we may answer this question negatively: the policy approaches of the two reports 
have not experienced a significant change since their main policy recommendations remained stable 
during the studied period of time. Yet, we have to take into account that the global financial crisis 
has stimulated at least a short term deviation from the ‘normal’ policy approach of the two reports. 
In the context of the crisis the economic reports recommend measures which constitute a partial 
deviation from the policy recommendations during the previous slumps and are described as 
exceptional. The crisis is treated by the reports as an exception which calls for exceptional 
responses. This assessment allows the reports to recommend policy measures extraneous to their 
general approach without being obligated to abandon their general conceptual framework. The 
exceptional character of the global financial crisis renders a revision of the prevailing views about 
economic policy unnecessary. Thus, the general concepts are maintained without further 
questioning. Regarding this approach to the crisis, we can hardly speak of a “paradigm change” in 
the policy approaches of the reports.  
 
 
New-Keynesian economics as the implicit policy paradigm of the expert discourse 
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Despite the severity of the global financial crisis and the general claim that crises facilitate a change 
of ideas, there has been no mayor change in the policy concepts of the two most important 
economic reports in Germany. Their approaches have not experienced a significant change: on the 
contrary, there is a high uniformity and stability in the policy recommendations of both reports. 
There appears to be a standardized, implicit approach behind the recommendations which seems to 
easily resist the uncertainty produced by the global financial crisis.44 The dominant policy approach 
in both reports involves long-term supply-side policy and short-term active monetary policy. These 
recommendations correspond to New-Keynesian economics.45 Although there is no full consensus 
among New-Keynesians regarding macroeconomic policy, prevalent policy recommendations can 
be identified. New-Keynesian economics asserts the possibility of difficulties arising in the self-
stabilizing capacities of the economy over the short term which can lead to increased economic 
fluctuations.46 Therefore, short term policy measures appear as a useful instrument to facilitate the 
re-adjustment of the economy in the case of a fluctuation. The two instruments of short term 
stabilization policy are monetary and fiscal policy. Most approaches in the New-Keynesian school 
favour monetary policy over active short run, fiscal policy.47  
                                                 
44 In analogy to Boyton and Deissenberg’s (1987) study about the implicit economic model in the media, the reports 
follow an implicit model of the economy. However, in contrast to this study, this paper does not seek to reproduce the 
implicit model by identifying its elements and relating these elements to each other into a comprehensive model. 
Instead the paper identifies the implicit model by comparing the recommendations of the reports with policy approaches 
in current macroeconomic models. This comparison suggests that the reports follow a New-Keynesian approach.  
45 Although the policy recommendations during the first post-reunification crisis appear to correspond to a New-
Keynesian approach, New-Keynesian economics is still developing during the time of this crisis. The emergence of 
New-Keynesian economics is frequently dated back to the early 1980s (Galí and Gertler, 2007, p. 26, Gordon, 1997, p. 
478, Snowdon and Vane, 1997b, p. 454). A milestone in its development is marked by the 1991 publication of “New 
Keynesian Economics” edited by Mankiw and Romer (1991).  
46 These difficulties in the self-adaptation arise, for instance, from wage rigidities and/or sticky prices. See Blanchard 
and Galí 2008, 2010, Espinosa-Vega and Russel, 1997, Galí and Gertler, 2007, Gordon 1997, Mankiw, 1990, 2008. 
47 Galí and Gertler, 2007, Mankiw, 1997, p. 448, Snowdon and Vane, 1997a, p. 469. One eminent example is the 
Newconsensus theory which is currently one of the most popular approaches among New-Keynesians. Newconsensus 
focuses solely on monetary policy and disregards the possibility of short run fiscal policy to stabilize the economic 
system. Monetary policy should stabilize the economy around the middle run equilibrium and the price level around a 
target inflation rate. Therefore, Newconsensus provides a monetary rule. The monetary rule determines an interest rate 
which will push the economy to the target inflation rate and the equilibrium output. According to NewConsensus 
approaches, monetary policy should be conducted through the alteration of interest rates (Arestis, 2003, 2007, Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler,, 1999; Woodford, 2003, 2010). Although current New-Keynesian approaches tend rather to promote 
countercyclical monetary than fiscal policy, New-Keynesians do not exclude fiscal policy from the range of potential 
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For the long run, New-Keynesians favor a neoclassical supply side policy.48 Supply side 
policy seeks to increase the economy’s appeal for investors. Policy options to improve investment 
conditions are labor market reforms and a moderate income policy. Supply side policy supports a 
relaxation of legal regulations on labor markets, a lessening of labor protection and the restraining 
of income growth rates.49 Additionally, the consolidation of the state budget (‘austerity measures’) 
is regarded as crucial since the public debt is believed to diminish the capital stock of economy.  
In short, New-Keynesians advocate an active short-term stabilization policy and support 
long-term neoclassical supply-side policies. This framework widely corresponds to the policy 
recommendations of the reports during each of the three crises. Even the global financial crisis has 




The objective of this article was to determine if there has occurred a significant change in the expert 
discourse on economic policy in Germany. This question was studied by taking the example of the 
two most important economic reports in Germany: the SVR and GD report. The policy 
recommendations of the two economic reports were compared during the last three economic 
slumps in order to identify a potential change in their policy approaches.  
Comparing the policy recommendations during the three slumps, it turns out that no 
significant change in the policy approaches of these two reports has taken place. The global 
financial crisis has so far stimulated only a slight and temporary deviation from the existing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
policy instruments. Nevertheless, the views about fiscal policy differ. For instance, during the financial crisis 
differences between optimistic (Romer and Bernstein, 2009) and rather critical (Cogan et al., 2009, Mankiw, 2008) 
views on fiscal stabilization policy become evident.  
48 Carlin and Soskice, 2006, pp. 108, p. 125, p. 387; Snowdon, Vane, and Wynarczk, 1994, p. 327; Truger, 2005, pp. 
255-61. 
49 Moreover, the public sector is conceived of as wasting economic capacity which can be deployed more efficiently in 
the private sector. Therefore, the public sector and its expenditure should be reduced. Mussel and Pätzold, 2008, pp. 11; 
Peters, 1995, pp. 245. 
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approaches but not a substantial change. Instead, the policy recommendations of the two reports 
show a high stability over time. Long run policy recommendations remain within the neoclassic 
supply side concept, favouring low wage growth, labour market flexibility and an austerity regime. 
A slight shift has occurred in the short run policy recommendations in which policy experts tend 
toward a more active, New-Keynesian approach.  
Despite the severity of the global financial crisis which nurtured the conviction of many 
commentators that economic discourses would change, there was no modification in the policy 
approach of the SVR and GD reports. This conclusion, however, does not preclude the possibility of 
a future change which could be facilitated by other unprecedented economic events. Yet, change is 
not the only possibility in the case of crisis. Instead, crises can also lead to a reinforcement of the 
existing policy concepts. This may be the case for the 2008/2009 global economic crisis.  
The absence of a significant change in economic policy concepts raises the question of why 
there is such consensus and perseverance in the policy recommendations of the two reports. Peter 
A. Hall‘s (1993) approach to paradigm change in governmental economic policy may help to 
explain the stability of Germany’s expert discourse on economic policy. Hall distinguishes between 
first- and second-order changes as opposed to third-order changes. While first- and second-order 
changes are adaptations which take place within the framework of an existing paradigm, a third-
order change refers to a radical change – a paradigm change – in thinking. Crises and anomalies can 
be the starting point for such a third-order change, since they may undermine the credibility of the 
prevailing paradigm. Nevertheless, according to Hall’s analysis, a crisis is not the only condition for 
a paradigm change in policy discourse. Another crucial factor is the institutional context in which 
the policy discourse is embedded. This institutional context is marked – among other factors – by 
the power constellations and discourses in social spheres (e.g. the media, voters, political parties) 
which are related to the policy discourse. A paradigm change can occur when powerful actors in 
these social spheres strive for a change in the prevailing policy concepts and promote a new 
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paradigm for policy discourse.50 As a consequence, whether a crisis leads to a paradigm change 
depends not only on the crisis itself but also on the institutional setting in which the policy 
discourse is embedded. In the case of Germany’s expert debate on economic policy, the institutional 
context appears to favor stability over substantial transformation of the policy discourse. Various 
elements in this context contribute to this stability. 
First of all, we can consider the impact of social spheres that are closely related to the expert 
discourse on economic policy. In times of crisis in which uncertainty prevails, the influence of these 
spheres on the expert discourse will increase and thus may potentially contribute to a paradigm 
change. 
It can be assumed that the most important social sphere shaping the expert discourse on 
economic policy is the academic sphere of macroeconomics.51 However, this sphere seems to have 
a rather stabilizing impact on the expert discourse. As argued above, there is a standardized policy 
approach in the reports that is applied during each of the slumps. This standardized approach 
corresponds to New-Keynesian economics which constitutes the most popular approach in the 
academic discipline of macroeconomics.52 Both reports appear to selectively follow this mainstream 
paradigm. That said, the academic mainstream in macroeconomics seems to be an important factor 
for shaping the policy approaches of the two reports and may – at least partly explain – the stability 
of the policy concepts in both reports.53  If this is correct, than a change in the policy discourses can 
                                                 
50 Hall, 1993; see also Jessop, 2009, p. 347. 
51 Within the academic sphere of macroeconomics, policy experts will focus particularly on comprehensive frameworks 
with policy implications, because only these frameworks are relevant for policy discourse. For this reason, many of the 
recent developments in macroeconomics will not have an impact on the expert discourse on economic policy, since they 
do not imply comprehensive policy approaches. 
52 The dominant position of New-Keynesianism is, for instance, illustrated by its prevalence in bestselling textbooks on 
macroeconomics. 
53 The opinions of SVR and GD on economic policy seem to be largely guided by the mainstream economic thinking of 
the academic field. The function of expert debates on economic policy as a translator of academic expert-knowledge 
into political debates contributes to this dependency. Economic experts with their economic reports are in a position 
(function) to translate the knowledge from the academic field through the channel of economic debates into politics 
(Frey and Kirchgässner, 2002, p. 467; Weingart, 2008, pp. 12). This strong dependency of experts’ policy debates is 
also guaranteed through the convergence of social actors in both spheres: experts who get assigned for reports like SVR 
and GD have to exhibit a strong academic background. Those who adhere to mainstream economics are more likely to 
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only be introduced by a prior change in the academic field of macroeconomics.54 In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, calls for a change have been raised within macroeconomics. Cabellero (2010), 
for instance, calls to turn from the complex and precise but rather irrelevant macroeconomic 
modelling towards creating more realistic and useful approaches. Yet, it is unclear if these pleas 
will lead to substantial changes within macroeconomics.  
Besides the academic field of macroeconomics, other social spheres may have an impact on 
the reports. One sphere that has a direct impact on the reports is national politics. The assignment 
procedure for the SVR and GD provides an example of this impact: the participating institutes and 
experts of both reports are assigned by national politicians. These politicians may have an interest in 
the experts’ policy concepts coinciding with their own political agenda. Therefore, their selection 
may be biased out of political interest.55 Also in this case, there prevails a stabilizing effect on the 
expert discourse.  
Another important factor for explaining the stability of the expert discourse is the absence of 
an alternative paradigm in the position to challenge the prevailing paradigm. One example of an 
alternative policy paradigm could be, for instance, postkeynesianism.56 However, postkeynesianism 
                                                                                                                                                                  
be successful in the academic field.  
54 Even a paradigm change in mainstream macroeconomics would not necessarily imply an immediate change in the 
expert discourse since the expert discourse may still adapt its thinking very reluctantly and selectively to the new 
developments. Nevertheless, changes in the mainstream politically relevant macroeconomic discourse remain the most 
probable source of radical innovations in the expert discourse on economic policy. 
55 At the same time the analysis of economic experts may also be biased by their political preferences as Saint-Paul 
(2011, 2012) shows.  
56 Postkeynesians emphasize the imperfections and flaws of the economy. From its imperfections and instability arises 
the general necessity of interventions into the economic system. Thus, Postkeynesians are strong supporters of 
interventions and control mechanisms (Arestis, 1996, p. 128; Pätzold and Baade, 2008, p. 39). They do not necessarily 
share the distinction between the short and long term with mainstream macroeconomics, and they promote a short to 
long term demand management. Above all, fiscal policy is in charge of this demand management. Fiscal policy should 
stimulate the demand side through public expenditure. The objective of this demand policy should be to achieve full 
employment (Hein and Stockhammer, 2007, p. 3; Arestis, 1996, p. 118; Arestis and Sawyer, 1998, p. 187). Some 
postkeynesian approaches suggest that monetary policy should maintain interest rates low to stimulate investment and 
preserve the distribution of income (Hein and Stockhammer, 2007, p. 24). With regard to the labour market, 
postkeynesian approaches usually argue against supply side reforms which aim for flexibility. Instead, they tend rather 
to advocate inflexibilities in the labour market – regulations and labour protection. Labour income is seen as a demand 
factor. Therefore it should grow in correspondence to the productivity of the economy. Low labour income growth may 
weaken the demand and cause low output growth rates (Snowdon, Vane, and Wynarczk, 1994, pp. 372; Hein and 
Stockhammer, 2007, pp. 25; Arestis and Swayer, 1998, p. 190; Heise, 2009, pp. 392).  
23 
 
clearly lacks the powerful support necessary to constitute a serious alternative. The postkeynesian 
approach occupies a rather marginalized status in the academic and political debates.57 To become a 
serious policy alternative, powerful actors from influential spheres must support the new paradigm 
and successfully promote it towards the expert discourse on economic policy. However, powerful 
alternatives which would pose a serious threat to the prevailing policy paradigm are not yet in 
sight.58  
Finally, there exists a high degree of stability within the SVR and GD report arrangements. 
There is little change in the staffing of the two reports: most experts in the SVR and institutes in the 
GD get reassigned during the studied time span. In the case of the GD, the majority of economic 
research institutes involved in writing the reports remained the same during the time span of our 
study. Also in the case of the SVR there is high stability: most of the experts get reassigned and 
participate during two periods – ten years – in the SVR reports. Thus, the absence of change in the 
composition of SVR and GD may have a stabilizing effect on the concepts supported by these 
reports. Moreover, the reports show tendencies to validate their approaches by evaluating previous 
recommendations in light of current developments as positive.59 This type of auto-validation will 
increase attachment to the underlying paradigm. 
Due to this strong attachment to the dominant policy model, alternative concepts appear to 
be outside the scope of the reports. Instead, the reports adhere to the existing model as practically 
taken for granted. Nevertheless, holding to the paradigm does not exclude small-scale adjustments. 
In order to deal with the anomalies of the global financial crisis, they undertake small-scale 
                                                 
57 Apart from some labor union representatives and macroeconomists who sympathize with this paradigm, there barely 
exists a lobby for this approach. 
58 Moreover, the economic development after each of the crisis supports the dominant policy approach. The positive 
development of Germany’s economy is attributed to the government’s policy which usually matches many of the 
recommendations from the expert reports. From this perspective, an alternative policy approach appears as needless due 
the perceived effectiveness of the prevalent approach. The positive development of Germany’s economy after the 
financial crisis is, for instance, often attributed to the active policy approach of the Merkel government as well as to the 
neo-liberal reforms of the “Agenda 2010” conducted by the Schröder government from 2003 until 2005. Many of the 
reforms in the context of the “Agenda 2010” coincide with the policy recommendations of the economic reports.     
59 One example are the recommendations concerning labour market flexibility which have partly been legislated by the 
German government. The decreasing unemployment rate is perceived as the outcome of their implementation. 
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adjustments. First- and second-order changes are carried out: the SVR recommends an 
improvement of bank regulation, and both reports support the rescue packages of the German 
government by emphasizing the peculiar nature of the crisis. These adjustments do not imply an 
abandonment of the underlying (New-Keynesian) policy paradigm. In contrast, the adjustments 
enable the reports to maintain their attachment to the prevailing policy paradigm. To what degree 
these (first- and second-order) changes can be extended without threatening the pillars of the 
existing paradigm and approaching a third-order change is at this point still an open question. 
In sum, Germany’s expert discourse on economic policy seems to be embedded in a context 
marked by the stabilizing influence of the academic discourse and politics, the absence of a 
powerful alternative, and a high stability in the arrangements of the reports. This context contributes 
more to the entrenchment of the prevailing policy model than to its renunciation and tends to protect 
the model against the unsettling impact of unprecedented crises. From this viewpoint, a paradigm 
change appears unlikely. Particularly the absence of an alternative paradigm which is promoted by 
powerful actors – as an important precondition for a paradigm change – renders a significant change 
in the policy discourse unlikely. One lesson that we may draw from this is that unprecedented and 
puzzling crises are by far no guaranty for substantial changes in policy discourse. Material and/or 
ideological crises do not directly translate into a paradigm change. Irrespective of the policy failures 
of the paradigm, it may survive due to an institutional setting which contributes to its preservation. 
Not crises or policy failure but the institutional setting may be the central variable for significant 
changes in policy discourse. Yet, in order to understand the role of the institutional setting which 
frames the dynamics of these discourses, further research into the internal and external factors 
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